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PREFACE
PUbLIC FINANCE IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS: A POLICy PAPER SERIES
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building 
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to 
collect and manage public resources. To implement 
peace accords and to provide public services, the 
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate 
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is 
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable. 
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation, 
and expenditure management are bound together 
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To 
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate 
in the eyes of its citizens. and to secure legitimacy, the 
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure 
effectively and equitably. 
The need to build legitimate and capable states in war-
torn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles 
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, 
adopted by the development ministers of major donor 
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is 
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break 
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of 
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as 
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now 
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed 
from downsizing states to building state capacity. 
Yet little systematic work has been done on what 
the international community can and should do to 
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, 
allocate, and spend public resources.  
This policy paper series, jointly published by the 
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at new York 
University and the political economy research Institute 
(perI) at the University of Massachusetts,  amherst, 
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative 
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar 
public finance. 
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to 
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons: 
First, governments must be able to ensure  »
sustainable funding for new democratic 
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions 
and redress grievances, and for public investments 
to promote economic growth and development. In 
the early post-war years, countries often receive a 
large influx of external assistance that temporarily 
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically 
diminishes over time, so domestic resources 
are necessary to sustain these institutions and 
programs. a key challenge is to ensure that aid 
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but 
instead stimulates their growth.
Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a  »
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in 
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. neither 
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international 
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. legitimacy 
comes in large part from government delivery of 
services that people need and want. elections 
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice 
demands; responding to those demands requires 
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public 
resources effectively.
Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra- »
legal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as 
to enhance security. In afghanistan, for example, 
control of border customs outposts is not only a 
fiscal issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control 
over revenues from natural-resource extraction, 
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West 
africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s 
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also 
in legitimate force. at the same time, domestic fiscal 
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing 
for public security after external peacekeepers 
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed 
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. 
The authors draw on extensive personal experience 
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and 
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace 
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar 
Statebuilding (Boulder: lynne rienner, 2007), the 
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding 
project.  after a concise recapitulation of the problems 
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing 
solutions that can be practically implemented. 
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience 
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult 
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the 
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks 
of building legitimate and effective states and building 
a durable peace. 
JaMeS K. BoYCe 
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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RESOURCES FOR PEACE? 
MANAGING REVENUES 
FROM EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES IN POST-
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARy
revenues from extractive sectors play an important 
role in many post-conflict environments. oil and 
gas, minerals, and logging often provide more 
than 30% of state fiscal receipts.When managed 
well, these revenues can help to finance postwar 
reconstruction and other vital peace-related needs. 
When mismanaged, however, resource revenues 
can undermine both economic performance and 
the quality of governance, thereby heightening 
the risk of renewed violence. Managing revenues 
from extractive industries is a crucial challenge for 
peacebuilding. This paper offers seven proposals 
that address this challenge.
1. MANDATE PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS 
WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO REGULATE 
RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
In the transition phase, peacekeeping forces 
should curtail access to resource revenues for 
potential “peace spoilers.” During the peace-
building phase, mission staff should seek to address 
broader linkages between resource extraction and 
conflict; where needed, this assistance should 
include deployment of peacekeeping forces in 
resource production areas and transportation hubs 
to help control exploitation and address resource-
related conflicts. In cases of UN trusteeship, 
activities of peacebuilding missions include 
the direct management of extractive sectors, 
but transitional authorities, whether local or 
international, should not grant long-term contracts 
in extractive sectors.
2. RECOVER STOLEN RESOURCE REVENUES, 
REAPPRAISE CONTRACTS, AND 
NEGOTIATE NEW CONTRACTS.
Major losses of public revenue often result 
from wartime looting and from the contractual 
provisions entered into by previous governments. 
Ex post facto policies are needed to recover stolen 
funds, not only to augment fiscal revenues but also 
to signal the end of impunity and discourage others 
from such behavior. In the wake of violent conflict, a 
systematic review of extractive sector activities and 
contracts should be undertaken, with the concept 
of “odious contracts” being applied to cancel past 
contracts when this is warranted. Tax reappraisal 
for activities conducted during the war should be 
considered, and penalties levied on companies that 
knowingly traded in conflict resources. Donors 
should encourage such reappraisal by providing 
technical assistance, by supporting civil society 
organizations that play a monitoring role, and by 
offering budgetary support to make up for potential 
revenue losses during review periods.  
3. MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC BENEFITS 
FROM RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
rather than rushing to involve foreign companies 
in resource extraction, domestic entrepreneurship 
should be developed to the fullest extent feasible. 
Some resources can yield greater domestic benefit 
if extracted through labor-intensive methods. 
Domestic ownership can be public, private, or a 
mix of the two. effective regulatory mechanisms 
in many ways are more central than the issue of 
ownership. Measures needed to guard against crony 
capitalism, asset stripping, and capital flight include 
transparency in contracts and revenues, and the 
establishment of firewalls between regulators and 
the regulated.
4. DISBURSE RESOURCE REVENUES 
DIRECTLY TO THE POPULATION.
revenue-sharing agreements between governments 
in a divided state, or between ruling parties in a 
coalition government, have a poor record in terms 
of risk of renewed conflict. as an alternative, direct 
revenue allocation to the population should be 
considered, particularly where poverty rates are 
high and resource revenues are substantial enough 
to make a real difference for the poor. Given the need 
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for state revenues, one option is a hybrid scheme 
whereby part of the revenue is distributed to the 
population directly, and the other part is retained 
by the government for public investment and 
social expenditure.  another option is to transfer 
all resource revenue to the population and then 
tax the receipts according to the income levels of 
the recipients. This would build tax administrative 
capacity and at the same time help to close the 
taxation-representation gap that afflicts many 
resource-dependent regimes, encouraging citizens 
to demand that the state justify its taxation and be 
accountable to its people. 
5. ESTABLISH RESOURCE-SPECIFIC 
REVENUE INSTRUMENTS.
Three major types of fiscal instruments can be 
created by domestic revenue management laws. 
First, revenue volatility-smoothing instruments 
should be promoted, with the support of donors 
and extractive companies, to reduce sharp 
variations in the level of revenues resulting from 
up-and-downs in resource revenues deriving from 
project cycles and resource prices. Second, savings 
funds can be established to offset depletion of 
non-renewable resources, but in light of immediate 
postwar needs these usually should be limited to a 
small amount of revenue whose management can 
help build institutional capacity for longer-term 
financial planning. Third, revenue management 
laws can establish allocation mechanisms, such as 
annual fund withdrawal ceilings and prescribed 
ratios of revenue allocation across areas and 
sectors. 
6. SET UP A RESOURCE COMPACT VIA AN 
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR FORUM AND ESTABLISH 
AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY.
The aim of a “resource compact” is to foster 
constructive engagement among stakeholders 
and improved regulatory capacities in terms of 
legislation, implementation, and monitoring. Such 
a compact can be forged by an extractive sector 
forum that brings together citizens, politicians, 
and companies in public debates. The forum 
should inform the general population about the 
resource sectors; identify the nature, objectives, 
and operational principles guiding the extractive 
sector; and provide a public platform for extractive 
sector stakeholders, thereby helping to fill the 
post-conflict regulatory deficit. an independent 
extractive sector monitoring body should be 
established by the compact, to complement state 
monitoring agency. 
7. NEGOTIATE AN INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR AGREEMENT 
AND ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL 
REVENUE MANAGEMENT AGENCY.
Finally, an international extractive sector 
agreement could reduce the economic and 
political risks faced by populations in producing 
countries. The agreement, drawing on relevant 
existing international law and codes of conduct, 
should define “conflict resources,” set clear norms 
and reporting procedures regarding revenues 
generated in conflict-affected countries, and 
identify punitive measures for companies found to 
be in violation of the agreement. The agreement 
should set contractual benchmarks and facilitate 
access to instruments that reduce revenue 
volatility and better distribute risk between 
companies and governments. an international 
revenue management agency would help to 
ensure that the “revenue pipeline” from companies 
to governments and populations is tight, so that 
revenues reach the population.
post-conflict environments present exceptional 
challenges and opportunities for improving. The 
proposals advanced in this paper are not equally 
applicable to all post-conflict cases. The specifics 
of the setting – including the sectors involved, the 
capacities of institutions, and the broader political 
and economic dynamics of the post-conflict 
recovery – will shape decisions on priorities from 
the menu of policy options. These options can 
do much to harness extractive resources to the 
requirements of peacebuilding. Their pursuit will 
require champions and appropriate incentives.
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RESOURCES FOR PEACE?
MANAGING REVENUES 
FROM EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES IN POST-
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
Philippe Le Billon1 
revenues from extractive sectors play an important 
role in many post-conflict environments, where 
petroleum, minerals, or timber frequently provide 
more than 30 percent of state fiscal receipts (see 
Figure 1).2  When managed well, resource revenues 
can help to finance reconstruction and other peace-
related needs. When mismanaged, however, resource 
revenues can undermine economic performance 
and the quality of governance, thereby raising the 
risk of renewed conflict and failing the hopes of 
populations.3 resource revenues need to be kept out 
of the reach of peace spoilers and directed towards 
statebuilding and economic recovery.  and in divided 
states, such as Sudan, disputes over resource revenue 
control have to be resolved. Managing revenues from 
extractive industries is thus crucial if peace is to be 
sustained.
FIGURE 1 – SHARE OF EXTRACTIVE SECTORS IN GOVERNMENT 
REVENUE AND GDP4
1 philippe le Billon is associate professor at the liu Institute for Global Issues and 
the Department of Geography of the University of British Columbia. he is the author 
of Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict (IISS & routledge, 2005).
2 one third of post-conflict countries since 1989 had fiscal dependence on 
extractive sectors above 30 percent (excluding foreign grants and loans) in 
the years following conflict termination. (Information culled from IMF country 
reports and peace research Institute in oslo conflict dataset).
3 For discussion, see Michael ross, “What do we know about natural resources 
and civil wars?” Journal of Peace Research 41(3), 2004:337-356; and philippe le 
Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, adelphi paper 
373, (london: routledge and IISS, 2005).
4 Data from IMF country reports and the peace research Institute in oslo (prIo).
This paper examines extractive sector challenges 
in post-conflict contexts and offers several 
proposals for resource revenues to consolidate 
a transition to peace. The first set of proposals 
relate to extraction management, including 
peacebuilding mission mandates, the recovery of 
looted wealth, post-conflict contract reappraisal, 
and the promotion of domestic entrepreneurship 
and employment. The second set refers to uses of 
resource revenues, including direct disbursement 
to the population and the creation of special 
funds. The final set concerns resource governance, 
including setting up a ”resource sectors compact” 
that brings together government, companies and 
civil society, and international agreements on 
extractive industries. 
CHALLENGES IN ”POST-CONFLICT” EXTRACTIVE 
SECTOR MANAGEMENT
The post-conflict context is often unfavorable for 
effective extractive sector revenue management 
for several reasons. First, governments often suffer 
from a lack of knowledge about the resources 
available for exploitation and recent developments 
in the sector – due, for example, to lapses in 
surveys, undocumented wartime resource 
exploitation, death or flight of qualified personnel, 
and outdated training. as a result, governments fail 
to maximize revenue collection, especially when 
negotiating with better informed companies.5 
Meanwhile, the population may have unreasonable 
expectations of revenues flowing out of the 
extractive sectors, and unsurprisingly attribute low 
official revenues to high government corruption. 
a major challenge is thus to rapidly acquire and 
spread knowledge about potential resource 
revenues, and to inform both policy decisions and 
public opinions. as a general principle, resource 
surveys, revenue flow analyses, tax structures, and 
information dissemination should be supported by 
international organizations assisting in the post-
conflict and reconstruction process.
Second, breaking the vicious cycle between high 
risks and low fiscal returns represents a major 
5 For example, recent progress in remote sensing (e.g. satellite imagery) or 
better advice on tax avoidance mechanisms can grant an advantage to companies.
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challenge. The risk of renewed conflict, degraded 
infrastructures, and uncertainties in the regulatory 
environment may disadvantage the government 
in its negotiations with investors.6 Governments 
often offer major tax incentives to attract large-
scale investments. post-conflict conditions also 
often attract the most risk-taking companies 
that may be more inclined to use bribery, deploy 
private armed protection, and take shortcuts in 
terms of corporate social responsibility. Financial 
institutions and donor governments eager to 
fast-track foreign direct investment (FDI) may 
turn a blind eye to the backgrounds and records 
of these companies.7 as a general principle, 
transitional authorities should not be granted the 
right to award long-term contracts for extractive 
projects. International assistance should provide 
for budgetary and security support both to lower 
risks and to help maximize fiscal returns.
Third, due to limited large-scale investment, 
resources are often first exploited through small-
scale ventures that offer livelihood opportunities 
for local populations but often prove difficult 
for the government to tax. This is often the 
case, for example, with logging and the mining 
of alluvial minerals. a major challenge in such 
6 hostilities and ‘high risk’ may be considered an advantage for some 
companies. For example, the stock market responded negatively to the end of 
hostilities in angola, probably considering that diamonds companies would face 
higher competition and stronger government bargaining power, see Massimo 
Guidolin and eliana la Ferrara, “Diamonds are forever, wars are not. Is conflict bad 
for private firms?,” American Economic Review, 2008.
7 risk insurance to resource projects may erode accountability and fiscally 
hurt citizens in both exporting and importing countries. Many financial 
institutions and credit agencies have sought to prevent such outcomes through 
principles of conduct and selection criteria. See, for example, the World Bank 
Group’s extractive Industries review, and the voluntary equator principles for 
the banking sector (http://www.equator-principles.com/) that build on the 
International Financial Corporation guidelines but remain voluntary and do 
not address major incentives such as bank staff bonuses linked with approved 
project financing. For discussion, see andreas Missbach, “The equator principles: 
Drawing the line for socially responsible banks? an interim review from an nGo 
perspective,” Development 47(3), 2004:78-84. For a critique of the role of export 
credit agencies, see Friends of the earth and pacific environment, Extractive 
Sector Projects Financed by Export Credit Agencies: The Need for Foreign 
Investment Contract and Revenue Reform, 2005.
cases is to balance local livelihood opportunities 
and fiscal revenue maximization. as a general 
principle, a comprehensive assessment of options 
for each sector and exploitation area should 
clarify objectives, outline possible scenarios, and 
help maximize broad developmental benefits. 
assessments and policies need to be based on the 
participation of local entrepreneurs and workers 
(including among the poorest), as well as free, 
prior, and informed consent by local communities.
Finally, budgetary allocation in post-conflict 
environments often presents special difficulties. 
Incentives for corruption are often heightened 
by the ephemeral character of political and 
bureaucratic appointments in transitional 
governments. political factors frequently intervene, 
notably through arrangements for revenue sharing 
between former belligerent parties. Corruption 
may be tolerated by both politicians and donors 
for the sake of “political stability.” Donor support 
for social services can weaken pressure on the 
government to allocate revenues to these high 
priority areas. Some donors may tie their nominally 
“unconditional” assistance to privileged access to 
resource sectors, such as the granting of resource 
projects to home companies or preferential 
treatment in resource supply access.8  a major 
challenge is thus to ensure that the path of revenue 
allocation consolidates both economic recovery 
and good governance. as a general principle, 
revenue allocation mechanisms should foster a 
sense of entitlement over revenues amongst the 
population, building incentives and mechanisms 
to protect revenues from abuses by governments 
and extractive industries.9 
PART 1: MANAGING EXTRACTION
The post-conflict transition is often characterized 
by a rush to extract natural resources: local 
populations need jobs, governments need revenue, 
and companies want to access the most attractive 
resource-extraction prospects. Undue haste is 
especially characteristic when elites are driven by 
8 See, for example, luke a. patey, “State rules: oil companies and armed conflict 
in Sudan,” Third World Quarterly 28(5), 2007:997-1016.
9 For discussion, see Macartan humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph e. Stiglitz, 
Escaping the Resource Curse, (new York: Columbia University press, 2007).
Transitional authorities should 
not award long-term contracts for 
extractive projects, especially if 
these include tax incentives.
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short-term personal interests and when donors 
actively promote FDI. Four main extraction-
management challenges arise in such contexts: 
regulating the post-conflict rush on resources; 
recovering looted assets and dealing with the 
legacy of “odious contracts” signed previously by 
belligerents or transitional governments; striking a 
balance between fiscal and other socioeconomic 
objectives; and averting the foreign take-over of 
resource sectors.
Regulating the “post-conflict rush”
extractive businesses are among the most resilient 
to armed conflicts. often they are the last to depart 
from conflict areas and the first to return after the 
end of hostilities.10  rapid recovery in the extractive 
sector is thus often possible. although restarting 
an industrial mine may take years, many local 
entrepreneurs and international “juniors” (mid-
size companies) handling small and medium-scale 
projects can rapidly increase outputs, as attested 
by diamond rushes in angola in the mid-1990s and 
Sierra leone in the early-2000s. These activities 
can help jump-start the economy, but their effect 
on postwar statebuilding can be ambivalent. Tax 
evasion, collusion with peace spoilers controlling 
resource production areas, conflicts with local 
communities, environmental degradation and labor 
abuses are frequent and difficult to regulate. not 
only are these businesses subject to overlapping 
and sometimes transient authorities, but they 
also frequently deploy their own private security 
forces.11  policies and legislation are often in a 
stage of reappraisal, while the ranks, capacity, and 
authority of resource management institutions are 
frequently depleted. The challenge is thus to fast-
track regulatory policies and institutions alongside 
– and preferably ahead of – the post-conflict 
10 In 1992, internal armed conflict was only ranked 20th among the investment 
criteria considered by international mining companies for exploration and 
mining; see James M. otto, “position of the peruvian Taxation System as Compared 
to Mining Taxation Systems in other nations,” 2002, available at http://www.mef.
gob.pe/InFeCo/documentos/perufinalreport_280504otto.pdf ; Jane nelson, The 
Business of Peace. The Private Sector as Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution, (london: International alert, Council on economic priorities, and the 
prince of Wales Business leaders Forum, 2000).
11 See Damian lilly and philippe le Billon, Regulating Business in Zones of 
Conflict: A Synthesis of Strategies, (london: overseas Development Institute, 
2002); Madeleine Drohan, Making a Killing: How and Why Corporations Use 
Armed Force to Do Business, (Toronto: random house Canada, 2003).
rush. regulations, however, need to be sensitive 
to livelihood opportunities for local populations. 
priority should thus be placed on regulating 
large scale extractive projects with long-term 
consequences, while artisanal and small-scale 
activities should be supported through legalization 
and capacity building (see proposal 3).
PROPOSAL 1: MANDATE PEACEBUILDING 
MISSIONS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO 
REGULATE RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
Multidimensional peacebuilding missions, 
including their peacekeeping forces, can be 
mandated and deployed in resource production 
areas and key transportation hubs to better control 
resource exploitation and address resource-related 
conflicts. Such a  mandate can be backed by a 
commodity sanction regime that is conditional 
upon adherence both to peace process benchmarks 
and legal practices in the resource sector. a logging 
sector, for example, can be closed for exports until 
sound regulatory institutions are in place, and until 
the security and political situation can ensure that 
these are effective on the ground.  
peacebuilding missions have often been hesitant 
about such roles, viewing these as high-risk 
burdens and distractions from their main mandate. 
In Sierra leone, the Un mission (UnaMSIl) 
actively engaged in diamond-sector regulation 
only in the last stages of its operation. Initially, it 
was wary of infringing its mandate, antagonizing 
local interest groups, exposing its troops to 
criminal violence, and reinforcing rumors of 
diamond deals by peacekeeping forces.12  Some 
of these concerns were legitimate. Yet reports 
from military observers about the importance 
of diamond-related conflicts, including on-going 
armed skirmishes, and assistance requests from 
the government and from donors funding diamond 
reforms led to its eventual engagement. From 
2003 onwards, UnaMSIl conducted aerial surveys 
and foot patrols, and targeted conflict-settlement 
interventions in the diamond sector, often jointly 
with the Ministry of Mines, but also occasionally in 
a supervisory capacity.
12 Interviews with UnaMSIl officers,  april 2001.
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Un peacebuilding missions have accumulated 
much experience as transitional authorities and in 
implementing sanction regimes: experience that 
could be collected and analyzed to improve future 
missions. In the transition phase, peacekeeping 
forces should focus on curtailing access to resource 
revenues for potential “peace spoilers.” This can 
be done by identifying players in the extractive 
industries, demilitarizing resource production 
areas, and closing down activities benefiting 
spoilers by targeting key trading intermediaries 
and transportation bottlenecks such as bridges 
and ports. peacekeeping forces can also intervene 
to prevent the escalation of resource-related 
conflicts, as in the clashes between local youths 
and demobilized rebel soldiers during the 2001 
“diamond rush” in Koidu, Sierra leone’s diamond 
capital.
During the peacebuilding phase, mission staff 
should seek to address broader linkages between 
resource revenues and conflicts, by assisting local 
authorities and international agencies in charge 
of the resource sectors. Monitoring activities, 
logistical support, and the “good offices” of the 
Un Secretary General’s Special representative can 
all contribute in this regard. In the Democratic 
republic of Congo, for example, the Un mission 
(MonUC) shares information collected on illegal 
logging with several Un agencies, nGos, and 
government authorities. 
In the case of UN trusteeship, activities include 
the management of extractive sectors.  Transitional 
authorities, whether local or international, should 
not be granted the right to award long-term 
contracts in extractive sectors.13  But revenues 
from resource sectors should be put under 
international trusteeship, or at least supervision.14 
even as trusteeship is relaxed as domestic post-
conflict institutions consolidate themselves, it is 
13 This principle is recognized in article 55 of the 1907 hague regulation 
(occupying state as “administrators and usufructuary”), and was upheld by a 
1976 US Department of Justice Memorandum, in the case of oil exploitation by 
Israel in the Sinai (reprinted 16 IlM 753, 1977). This principle can be applied to 
domestic transitional governments through local legislation, peace agreement, or 
Un Security Council resolution.
14 See for example, philippe le Billon, “Getting it done,” in Ian Bannon and paul 
Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts: Actions and Options, 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 215-286.
desirable to maintain external supervision and 
a capacity to intervene in revenue management, 
possibly for as long as a decade. Given sensitivities 
over sovereignty, such efforts risk raising questions 
about the motives of intervening parties unless 
strict independence and an absence of vested 
interests can be demonstrated. With regard to the 
opening of oil fields, the australian intervention in 
east Timor and the american intervention in Iraq 
offer cautionary examples.
Recovering looted assets and tackling odious 
contracts
Major losses of public revenue can result from 
wartime looting and contractual provisions 
inherited from previous governments. International 
aid can mask these losses, but they become more 
apparent when donor fatigue sets in and countries 
are most in need of sustained revenues.
PROPOSAL 2: RECOVER STOLEN RESOURCE 
REVENUES, REAPPRAISE CONTRACTS, AND 
NEGOTIATE NEW CONTRACTS.
Ex post facto policies are needed for the recovery 
of “looted” resource wealth and the reappraisal 
and renegotiation of contracts. Wealth recovery 
seeks to identify and repatriate the proceeds 
generated by illegal resource exploitation, as 
defined by domestic legislation or international 
sanction regimes. This can include the assets of 
rebel groups and members of unconstitutional 
governments, and the proceeds of companies 
that participated in illegal commercial activities. 
The objective is not only to recover money to 
add to fiscal revenues, but also to signal the end 
of impunity and discourage extractive companies 
and banking institutions from participating in war-
time resource looting.15  
For contractual reappraisal, a first step is full 
disclosure of contracts, corporate structure and 
ownership. Confidential commercial clauses are 
not to be considered legally valid, given that the 
review is legally mandated for all contracts in the 
country. Tax evasion and abusive practices including 
15 For a presentation of challenges and options, see the joint office on Drugs 
and Crime (UnoDC) and World Bank ‘Stolen assets recovery’ (Star) initiative, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/neWS/resources/Star-rep-full.pdf.
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tax holidays, transfer pricing, biased commodity-
pricing mechanisms, and liability sheltering need 
to be revoked. This requires a systematic review of 
extractive sector activities and contracts, including 
those involving state companies, with a concept 
of “odious contracts” being applied to cancel 
existing contracts if necessary.16  Tax reappraisal 
for company activities conducted during the war 
should be considered, and penalties imposed 
on companies that knowingly traded in conflict 
resources (see below). 
Donors should support such reappraisal through 
technical assistance and support for civil society 
organizations demanding and monitoring changes. 
To gain the support of domestic authorities, 
donors should consider providing budgetary 
support to make up for potential losses in revenue 
during review periods. In order for this process to 
be meaningful, reviews must be open, with their 
findings and contractual revisions made public. If 
necessary, disciplinary measures against reluctant 
companies and governments should be considered, 
including through the targeted reactivation of 
United nations Security Council sanctions.
Tracking down assets requires extensive expertise, 
judicial support, and collaboration from financial 
institutions.17 The focus in such cases should 
be on major investors, traders, and exporters. 
Measures including judicial due process and the 
disbandment of political militias should be in place 
16 The concept of ‘odious contract’ is also applied to ‘odious debt’ contracted 
by past governments against the interests of the people, without their consent, 
and with the full awareness of the creditor. For discussion, see ashfaq Khalfan, 
Jeff King, and Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, (Montreal: 
Centre for International Sustainable Development law, 2003); and patricia alvarez-
plata and Tilman Brück, “postwar Debts: Time for a new approach,” in James K. 
Boyce and Madalene o’Donnell, eds., Peace and the Public Purse: Economic 
Policies for Postwar Statebuilding, (Boulder : lynne rienner. 2007).
17 See Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. roule, “Follow the money: The finance 
of illicit resource extraction,” in Ian Bannon and paul Collier, eds., Natural 
Resources and Armed Conflicts: Actions and Options, (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2003), pp. 161-214.  among the rare cases of legal prosecution, in 2006 a 
Dutch timber merchant, Gus van Kouwenhoven, was sentenced to eight years of 
imprisonment for breaking the Un arms embargo on liberia.
to prevent politicians exposed for malpractices 
from “spoiling” the peace. Such policies may deter 
future investments if contractual criteria are not 
clear. adoption of an international extractive sector 
agreement (see below) would provide guidelines 
for such contractual reappraisal. 
Despite these constraints, there have been some 
successes in contractual amendments. In the 
Democratic republic of Congo, a national assembly 
commission led by Christophe lutundula identified 
dozens of illegal or dubious contracts signed 
between 1996 and 2003.  Its December 2005 report 
recommended the renegotiation or cancellation of 
16 contracts, judicial investigation of 28 Congolese 
or international companies, and prosecution for 
fraud of 17 persons. The Congolese parliament has 
repeatedly delayed official consideration of this 
report, with some senior politicians implicated 
in these deals hoping to bury it.18  Yet following 
repeated calls by civil society and opposition 
politicians for contractual reviews, another 
government commission concluded in late 2007 
that out of 61 mining contracts reviewed – many 
of them signed during the “transition” period – 38 
contracts had to be renegotiated and 23 cancelled 
because of irregularities.19 
In liberia, forestry concessions were cancelled, 
and president ellen Sirleaf-Johnson was able to 
renegotiate an iron ore mining contract between 
Mittal Steel and the previous transition government 
that, among other abusive clauses, had allowed the 
company to determine the price of iron ore and 
thereby its own taxation rate. public exposure 
of inequities in the contract by Global Witness, an 
international nGo with a strong track-record that 
mobilized external technical expertise, as well as 
Sirleaf-Johnson’s own background in banking and her 
international profile as africa’s first elected female 
president, contributed to substantially improving 
the  new contractual terms (see Table 1).20
18 The Curse of Gold (Washington DC: human rights Watch, 2005); lutundula 
Commission report, December 2005 available at http://www.freewebs.com/
congo-kinshasa..
19 J. Clayton, “Mining groups face Congo shake-up after review,” The Times, 
november 8, 2007.
20 Global Witness, Heavy Mittal? A State within a State. The inequitable 
Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of Liberia and 
Mittal Steel Holdings NV, 2006.
abusive practices need to be revoked. 
This requires a systematic review 
of extractive sector activities and 
contracts, with a concept of  ‘odious 
contracts’ being applied to cancel 
existing contracts if necessary.
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Table 1 - Fiscal aspecTs oF MiTTal conTracT  
renegoTiaTion in liberia21  
Initial Contract Renegotiated Contract
Mittal sets iron ore price, and thus 
effective royalty rate and tax rate
Iron price set by 
international market price
Five year tax holiday, with 
unlimited extension
no tax holiday
obligations guaranteed 
only by concessionaire 
(Mittal’s subsidiary)
obligations guaranteed 
by parent company
Transfer to Mittal of main national 
railway line and deep-sea port
no transfer, no 
exclusive right
extended and backdated 
equitable treatment clause
equitable treatment clause 
limited to iron ore sector 
and no backdating
Concessionaire rights to all 
minerals in the concession area
rights to iron ore only
Contract governed by 
United Kingdom law
Contract governed 
by liberia law
Minimal social obligations national senior 
managers and health 
care obligations
Revisiting liberalization policies
extractive sectors have been liberalized since the 
late 1980s, particularly in post-conflict countries. 
liberalization policies often increased foreign 
investment and economic output, using reduced 
taxation rates as a core incentive. The overall fiscal 
impact has varied among countries, but observers 
have pointed to long-term risks associated with 
lower fiscal returns on non-renewable resources.22 
Fiscal regimes have privileged income tax and 
production sharing agreements (pSas) that 
grant the government a share of the resource 
earnings, rather than royalties or publicly owned 
companies.23  one problem is that the terms of the 
21 Global Witness, Update on the Renegotiation of the Mineral Development 
Agreement between Mittal Steel1 and the Government of Liberia. august 2007.
22 James M. otto, “Global changes in mining laws, agreements and tax 
systems,” Resources Policy 24(2), 1998: 79-86; Gavin Bridge, “Mapping the 
bonanza: geographies of mining investment in an era of neoliberal reform,” The 
Professional Geographer 56(3), 2004: 406-421.
23 In azerbaijan, for example, oil and gas fields with weak future prospects 
continued to be operated by the state oil company (SoCar), whereas “new 
fields are developed and managed under the leadership of international partners” 
and their income is shared between government and companies according to a 
pre-determined production sharing agreements, see IMF,  “azerbaijan republic – 
resulting agreements reflect the limited bargaining 
power of post-conflict states. a second problem 
is that politicians often take decisions with long-
term impacts based on short-term considerations. 
They may be more eager, for example, to invite a 
foreign company that is able to jump-start a project 
and offer a large signature bonus than to develop 
a domestic industry, ignoring the downsides of 
locking the resource sector into foreign control 
and exacerbating its “enclave” character. 
PROPOSAL 3: MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC BENEFITS 
FROM RESOURCE EXTRACTION, INCLUDING NOT 
ONLY REVENUE BUT ALSO LOCAL EMPLOYMENT, 
DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND NET 
NATIONAL PRODUCT.
attracting foreign companies to the extractive 
resource sector is frequently the major priority 
of the government and aid donors alike. Yet 
domestic benefits may be better secured outside 
of fast-tracked FDI projects. Some resources, such 
as timber and surface deposits of high grade ore, 
can be exploited through labor-intensive methods 
requiring minimal technological and capital 
inputs. These modes of exploitation (artisanal or 
small-scale) may have lower tax potential, but they 
often have higher net national value added than 
capital intensive projects (see Table 2). Domestic 
ownership provides more flexibility over rates of 
taxation for sectors under domestic ownership 
than those imposed by the “global norm” of foreign 
investment.
Domestic ownership can be public or private, or 
a mix of both. private ownership can help to hold 
the state accountable, but the state must also hold 
the private sector accountable. effective regulatory 
mechanisms are, in important ways, more central 
than the issue of public versus private ownership.24 
In practice, governments have frequently sought to 
bail out private companies – for example, through 
Selected Issues and Statistical appendix.” IMF Country Report No. 03/130, 2004. 
Such a model was also promoted under a controversial draft oil law for Iraq. For a 
critique, see Greg Muttit, Crude Designs - The Rip-off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth, (london: 
platform, 2005)
24 erika Weinthal and pauline Jones luong, “Combating the resource curse: an 
alternative solution to managing mineral wealth,” Perspectives on Politics 4(1), 
2006: 35-53.
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tax exemption - when faced with the prospect of 
large-scale unemployment or when key political 
supporters are at risk. Measures are needed, in any 
case, to prevent crony capitalism, asset stripping, 
and capital flight. among these are transparency 
in contracts and revenues, and firewalls between 
regulators and regulated. 
Table 2 compares FDI-industrial and domestic-
artisanal (or small-scale) resource extraction. 
Industrial exploitation generally provides higher 
resource recovery rate than artisanal methods. 
Yet higher imported inputs, expatriate wages, 
depreciation, and profit repatriation reduce the net 
national product (nnp) of industrial production 
below that of domestic artisanal extraction. The 
potential advantage of industrial exploitation is 
higher tax revenue, but only assuming sound tax 
policies. attention should also be given to indirect 
economic effects of both modes of production. 
Domestic small-scale operations can generate 
crucial financial capital for rural economies and 
more local economic development.
Table 2 – Foreign-indusTrial versus doMesTic-arTisanal 
resource exTracTion25 
FDI-industrial Domestic-artisanal
Value of resource deposit 100 100
resource recovery (gross output) 95 70
Material inputs
   • Imported
   • Locally produced
20
7
3
1
Gross Domestic product 68 66
Wages and payments
   •  Expatriates
       of which repatriated 
   •  Nationals
7
3.5
14
0
-
50
Tax payments 20 4
Depreciation 9 1
repatriated profits 18 11
Gross national product 46.5 55
net national product 37.5 54
25 This table builds on the case of mining in Sierra leone; see Tony Killick, “The 
benefits of Foreign Direct Investment and its alternatives: an empirical exploration,” 
Journal of Development Studies 9(3), 1973: 301-316. Some domestic-artisanal 
profits are repatriated by exporters with transnational ties (e.g. diasporas or 
domestic elites with family members abroad). See also D. F. Stewart, “large-scale or 
small scale mining: Meeting the needs of developing countries,” Natural Resource 
Forum 13(1), 1989: 44-52. repatriated profits in domestic artisanal correspond to 
“capital flight”, notably from diaspora and dual-nationality exporters (such as Sierra 
leonean lebanese).
PART 2: CHANNELING REVENUES
The uses of revenues from extractive sectors is 
a major political and economic issue. politically, 
revenues can undermine a transition to democracy 
and exacerbate identity politics. economically, 
revenues can retard economic diversification and 
jeopardize sustainable economic recovery. Both 
sorts of risk are particularly acute in low-income 
divided states facing high levels of “horizontal” 
inequalities between social groups with distinct 
identities.26  Two key challenges in post-conflict 
revenue management are therefore (1) how to 
address resource-related identity politics, and 
(2) how to ensure that revenues contribute to a 
sustainable and diversified economy.
Resources and identity politics
a distinction can be made between resources and 
resource revenues. The territory where resources 
are located may be indivisible, whereas resource 
revenues can be easily divided. The difference 
was built into the peace agreement in South 
Sudan, a compromise in which the ownership 
of oil reserves was left outside the scope of the 
agreement, until a referendum takes place, while 
focusing instead on oil revenue sharing and 
petroleum sector management. The problem is to 
create a revenue sharing arrangement that is as 
secure as a territorial division would be.27 
With respect to resources, populations in producing 
regions have claims related not only to ownership 
but also to the socio-environmental impacts 
associated with resource extraction. There is now 
a substantial body of experience in addressing 
these impacts.28  But experiences in post-conflict 
countries remain relatively few and far between. 
In Sierra leone’s diamond sector, a scheme was 
established to allocate some of the diamond export 
26 See Frances Stewart, Graham Brown and alex Cobham, Promoting Group 
Justice: Fiscal Policies in Post-Conflict Countries, (new York: Center on 
International Cooperation, and amherst, Ma: political economy research Institute, 
policy paper on public Finance in post-Conflict environments, 2002).
27 See Jostein F. Tellnes, “The unexpected deal: Why the Government of Sudan 
and the SplM/a reached an agreement on oil issues through the IGaD peace 
talks 2002-04,” Unpublished paper, (Centre for the Study of Civil War, oslo: prIo, 
2005)
28 Béatrice labonne, “The mining industry and the community: Joining forces 
for sustainable social development,” Natural Resource Forum 23(4), 1999: 
315-322.
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tax revenue to local communities. This promoted 
the formalization of artisanal mining ventures, 
helping to raise taxes while returning some of the 
revenue to local communities. The scheme suffered 
from several shortcomings, however: it was not 
implemented for large industrial ventures, despite 
the fact that these often had the largest socio-
environmental “footprint;” and many customary 
chiefs who received much of the revenues were 
not accountable to communities.29
experiences over the past two decades suggest that 
revenue sharing agreements between governments 
in a divided state, or between ruling parties 
in a coalition government, have a poor record 
in terms of risk of renewed conflict.30  Wealth 
sharing may facilitate the positive conclusion of a 
peace negotiation, but this does not guarantee a 
positive outcome over the medium term. Indeed, 
such agreements can have several negative 
consequences: 
• First, revenue sharing negotiated under false 
pretences can enable belligerents to rearm. In 
Sudan, for example, oil fields were developed 
under the terms of the 1997 Khartoum peace 
agreement, which granted several Southern 
armed factions a share of oil revenues in 
exchange for a cessation of hostilities. This 
agreement eventually collapsed and conflict 
in the region reignited, this time with a much 
wealthier Sudanese government. 
• Second, resource revenue allocation may be 
perceived as rewarding the belligerent party, 
providing incentives for other groups to follow 
suit in a “copycat” effect. The Sudan liberation 
29 Global Witness, “peacebuilding omission?,” october 2007.  available 
at http://www.globalwitness.org/data/files/pages/global_witness_pbc_
submission_101007.pdf.
30 philippe le Billon and eric nicholls, “ending ‘resource Wars’: revenue 
Sharing, economic Sanction, or Military Intervention?,” International 
Peacekeeping 14(5), 2007: 616-635; ongoing research at prIo by helga Malmin 
Binningsbø and Siri aas rustad.
army in Darfur, for example, is perceived as 
motivated in part by the example of the oil-
revenue sharing deal negotiated with the 
government by the Sudan people’s liberation 
army in southern Sudan.31 
• Third, sectarian divisions of resource revenues 
risk aggravating tensions among communities. 
In nigeria, state-based revenue allocation 
relying on identity politics undermined secular 
modern governance through the reshaping 
of incompatible community identities.32  In 
Iraq, securing oil revenue allocation based on 
population rather than on a territorial basis is 
a preoccupation for Sunni arab political parties 
based in areas with little proven oil reserves, 
and the regional autonomy promoted by oil-rich 
Shiite and Kurdish political parties promotes 
mistrust.33
Some central governments have sought to 
address antagonistic identity politics through 
fiscal decentralization, with mixed results.34 
The process through which decentralization is 
achieved seems to matter as much as its economic 
outcomes. The best results, as in South africa and 
Mozambique, have been characterized by broad 
popular participation (including by minority 
groups), bargaining between government and sub-
national groups, state outreach in remote areas, 
trust-building among groups participating in local 
governance institutions, and revenue redistribution 
across regions. Building on these experiences, 
direct disbursement of revenues to the population 
31 John Young, “Sudan: a flawed peace process leading to a flawed peace,” 
Review of African Political Economy 32(103), 2005: 99-113.
32 Michael J. Watts, “antinomies of community: Some thoughts on geography, 
resources and empire,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
29, 2004: 195-216. Yash Ghai, “Decentralization and the accommodation of ethnic 
Diversity,” in C. Young (ed). Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy. A Comparative 
Inquiry, (Basingstoke: palgrave, 1998).
33 The clause of the 2005 Iraqi constitution guaranteeing a distribution of “oil 
and gas revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in 
all parts of the country” only applies to currently developed fields. revenues from 
undeveloped fields were left under the control of regional authorities.
34 arild Schou and Marit haug, “Decentralisation in Conflict and post-Conflict 
Situations,” Working paper 2005:139, (Blindern: norwegian Institute for Urban 
and regional research, 2005); Joseph Siegle and patrick o’Mahony, “assessing 
the merits of decentralization as a conflict mitigation strategy,” Development 
alternatives Inc., 2007 available at http://www.dai.com/pdf/Decentralization_
as_a_Conflict_Mitigation_Strategy.pdf.
revenue sharing agreements between 
governments in a divided state, or 
between ruling parties in a coalition 
government, have a poor record.
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can be proposed as a way to reframe the 
institutional and economic relationships among 
resources, governments, and the people.
PROPOSAL 4: DISBURSE RESOURCE REVENUES 
DIRECTLY TO THE POPULATION
as an alternative to channeling resource revenues 
through regional and local governments and the 
parties that control them, direct disbursement 
to the population offers several advantages.35 
Direct revenue allocation provides tangible 
evidence of a ‘peace dividend’ for the population. 
recent studies show that direct cash payments 
contribute positively to poverty alleviation and 
disaster recovery, including in conflict-affected 
environments.36 Direct disbursement to the 
population also sends a signal that resources are 
owned by the people, not by the government 
or the parties that control it. This can increase 
pressure on companies and governments to 
maximize public revenues. If the choice is made 
to distribute the revenue equally across the entire 
population, this can contribute to a sense of 
national identity and common destiny. last but not 
least, direct disbursement is less subject than the 
government budget to political manipulation and 
associated grievances. 
are direct revenue transfers unrealistic given low 
state capacity, lack of information on citizens, 
and rudimentary financial and fiscal systems in 
many post-conflict countries? Direct payments 
of oil revenues have been suggested in the case 
of Iraq, only to be quickly dismissed due to 
35 The alaska permanent Fund Dividend established in 1976 is among the 
oldest scheme specifically aimed at direct disbursement (see http://www.apfc.
org/; Scott Goldsmith, “The alaska permanent Fund Dividend: an experiment in 
Wealth Distribution,” paper presented at the ninth Congress of Basic Income 
european network, Geneva, Switzerland, September 12-14, 2002 available at 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/publications/BIen--permanent%20Fund%20
Dividend%20paper.doc. See also Xavier Sala-i-Martin and arvind Subramanian, 
“addressing the natural resource Curse: an Illustration from nigeria,” NBER 
Working Paper 9804 (Cambridge, Ma, 2003).
36 paul harvey, “Cash-based Responses in Emergencies,” HPG Report 24 
(london : overseas Development Institute, February 2007).
continued insecurity and weak bureaucracy.37 But 
the situation in Iraq is not post-conflict. logistical 
challenges remain in many real post-conflict cases, 
but they can be overcome. Moreover, tackling them 
can provide benefits beyond putting money in the 
hands of individual citizens. For example, the tasks 
of peacebuilding missions often include voter 
registration. This “political entitlement” process 
could be matched with an economic entitlement 
process, whereby a system of citizen identification 
is set up. The basis for income tax collection can 
also be strengthened, by providing an incentive to 
enter into a formal financial relation with the state. 
Direct disbursement can also help to build – or 
rebuild – the financial sector. 
apart from implementation difficulties, direct 
revenue transfers may pose other problems. 
The transaction costs may make this option 
uneconomic when per capita revenues are low. If 
revenues are spent on non-productive imported 
goods, this can be detrimental to the trade 
balance and undermine local production. political 
manipulation can still occur, notably in the timing of 
revenue disbursement.38  and direct disbursement 
does not itself resolve the particularistic claims of 
populations in production regions.
In the absence of adequate alternative sources of 
revenue, direct disbursement may also reduce the 
state’s ability to public goods and services. If direct 
disbursement of revenues were used to justify and 
legitimate privatization reforms of public services, 
this could have a regressive impact on the poorest. 
Given the need for state revenue, one option is 
a hybrid scheme, whereby part of the revenue is 
distributed to the population directly and the other 
part goes to the government for public investment 
and social expenditure. 
an alternative way to address the need for state 
revenue is to not only transfer revenues to the 
population, but also to tax them according to the 
37 Thomas palley, “oil and the case of Iraq,” Challenge 47(3), 2004: 94-112.
38 For example, direct disbursement was made in the 1950s by the government 
of alberta, Canada, just prior to an election. See robert Bacon and Silvana Tordo, 
“experiences with oil Funds: Institutional and Financial aspects,” (Washington 
DC: energy Sector Management assistance program, World Bank, 2006).
Direct disbursement to the population 
sends a signal that resources are owned 
by the people, not by the government 
or the parties that control it.
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income levels of the recipients.39  This would have 
a progressive income effect, leaving more revenue 
in the hands of the poorest. at the same time, it 
would inform citizens about both the revenues 
generated by the extractive sector and the funding 
requirements of the state. This system could help 
close the taxation-representation gap that afflicts 
many resource-dependent regimes, leading citizens 
to demand that the state justify its taxation and be 
accountable to the people. 
Donor support for such a scheme could help 
to advance the economic objective of poverty 
reduction and the political objective of state-
building. Donors could step in to compensate 
for state revenue losses and thereby provide 
an incentive for the government to support this 
scheme. This budget support could be phased-
in to respond to the absorptive capacity of the 
government, and phased-out to incentivize the 
state to develop its fiscal autonomy and foster 
economic diversification.
Contributing to a sustainable and diversified 
economy 
economic recovery is a priority and a moral 
obligation in post-conflict contexts, given 
years of violent dispossession, neglect and 
curtailed opportunities. Moreover, peace can be 
consolidated by tangible peace dividends, reduced 
unemployment, and channeling efforts into 
“business” rather than divisive politics. It would be 
naïve, however, to think that economic recovery is 
not political, or that it is inevitably conducive to 
building a durable peace. rather, attention needs 
to be paid to the ways and means through which 
recovery is achieved.
The channeling of resource revenues ideally should 
foster a diversified and sustainable economy 
that insures against future growth collapse and 
39 See Martin Sandbu, “natural Wealth accounts: a proposal for alleviating the 
natural resource curse,” World Development 34(7), 2006: 1153–1170. Income 
levels may be difficult to determine and enforce. a possible option is to have 
individuals self-identify as poor, middle, or rich, with their tax rate varying 
accordingly. Self-identification could be posted on a public notice board at 
the post office (or wherever dividend payments are disbursed), letting social 
pressure/status concerns act as an enforcement mechanism for truthful self-
identification (James Boyce, pers. com, october 2007).
thereby reduces the risk of a renewed outbreak of 
hostilities. But extractive sectors present several 
challenges to sustainability and diversification:
• First, extractive sectors often rely on non-
renewable resources. Investments in 
prospecting and more efficient technologies 
can augment the status of reserves, but these 
are ultimately finite. Dividend savings funds, 
as in the case of norway’s, may be part of the 
solution to resource depletion. But in post-
conflict countries, reconstruction and social 
needs militate against setting aside a substantial 
fraction of resource revenues (see below).
• Second, extractive resources tend to create a 
“resource trap” or “staple trap,” locking countries 
into dependence and exposing them to future 
revenue instability.40  revenue windfalls resulting 
from booming prices or one-time bonuses may 
generate unsustainable expenditures and policy 
“myopia,” delay reforms, and create unrealistic 
expectations within the population. revenue 
collapses, on the other hand, may induce 
governments to borrow beyond their means.
• Third, resource revenues face a high risk 
of capture by ruling elites unless robust 
institutions are in place to prevent this. There is 
good evidence that extractive-sector revenues 
are especially vulnerable to embezzlement, 
and that resource wealth is correlated with 
higher levels of perceived corruption in low-
income countries.41 There is also some evidence 
40 See richard M. auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development, 
(oxford: oxford University press, 2001). In principle, reinvesting revenues into 
other sectors could assist diversification, but in practice, many countries fail to 
efficiently manage this process due to misdirected resource revenue allocation 
(e.g. through so-called ‘white elephants’ projects, protection of uncompetitive 
‘infant-industry’, or corruption), constraints on labor skills, and trade barriers. 
There are also incentives not to diversify the economy in order to curtail the risk 
of political competition coming from independent sectors. Diversification is also 
harder now that much of the manufacturing sector has already been “captured” 
by the first and second generations of newly Industrialized Countries, most 
recently by China. For discussion of the latter constraint, see raphael Kaplinsky, 
Dorotha McCormick and Mike Morris, The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan 
Africa. China office, DFID, 2006; Ian Coxhead, “a new resource Curse? Impacts 
of China’s Boom on Comparative advantage and resource Dependence in 
Southeast asia,” World Development 35(7), 2007: 1099-1119; and Mauricio 
Mesquita Moreira, “Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in latin 
america?” World Development 35(3), 2007: 355-376.
41 Carlos leite and Jens Weidmann,  “Does Mother nature Corrupt - natural 
resources, Corruption, and economic Growth,” IMF Working papers 99/85, 1999.
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that levels of corruption increase in post-
conflict situations, possibly due to increased 
opportunities coupled with competitive politics 
and economic liberalization.42 
PROPOSAL 5: IMPLEMENT RESOURCE-SPECIFIC 
REVENUE INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING REVENUE 
VOLATILITY-SMOOTHING, SAVINGS FUND, 
TARGETED ALLOCATION, AND MEASURES FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
recent international efforts to address these 
challenges have been devoted mostly to 
transparency issues. examples include the 
extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(eITI), the publish What You pay campaign, 
and the IMF’s Guide on resource revenue 
Transparency (GrrT).43 International support for 
revenue stabilization mechanisms, in contrast, has 
faltered in the past two decades.44  Meanwhile, 
with the exception of opeC, most commodity 
producer organizations have given up their price 
stabilization activities. 
Domestic “revenue management laws” generally 
define the principles and objectives of resource 
revenue management. Transparency, accountability, 
representation and equity are major issues these 
laws must address in order to avoid revenue 
capture by narrow interest groups  and to reduce 
risks of (renewed) armed conflict. They can also 
create three major types of fiscal instruments. 
First, revenue volatility-smoothing instruments 
seek to reduce sharp variations in the level 
of revenues resulting from ups-and-downs in 
resource production or resource prices. This can 
be achieved through stabilization funds setting 
aside revenues when these exceed forecasts or the 
government’s absorption capacity, and by releasing 
reserve funds when revenues decrease. Savings 
funds serve a similar function, but with a longer 
42 philippe le Billon “Corruption and the ‘liberal peace’: peacebuilding and 
post-conflict patterns of corruption,” International Peacekeeping, 15(2), 
forthcoming 2008.
43 For information, see http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/; and 
http://www.eitransparency.org/.
44 Multilateral schemes to lessen commodity price shocks, such as the IMF’s 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and the eU’s Flex mechanisms, 
are limited in scope and hard to access.
term horizon, seeking not to buffer variations but 
to build a future source income, in particular when 
the resource will be exhausted. Ironically, these 
have generally been introduced where they are 
least needed; that is, where sound fiscal policies are 
already observed and resource revenues represent 
only a small part of fiscal inflows.45  Stabilization 
funds should be encouraged in post-conflict 
contexts given the major volatilities in resources 
revenues, provided that these are well integrated 
into budgetary management and secured from 
embezzlement. Savings funds, in contrast, are not a 
priority given post-conflict economic recovery and 
social needs. establishing a savings fund can be 
part, however, of a program of institution building. 
But allocating significant amounts of money to it 
in the early phase of the transition may be more 
a source of tension than a contribution to state 
consolidation.
Finally, revenue management laws can establish 
allocation mechanisms, such as an annual 
fund withdrawal ceiling and ratios of revenue 
allocation to areas (such as provinces) and sectors 
(such as health and education). Introducing 
or consolidating such legislation and the 
administrative and oversight bodies needed to 
implement it should be a priority of post-conflict 
state-building. one option is to put the proposed 
legal framework to a referendum. not only would 
this grant stronger legitimacy but it would also 
help mobilize and involve communities in debating 
the draft. The absence of flexibility in budgetary 
allocation, however, can be a source of tension, as 
demonstrated in the case of Chad’s crisis over oil 
revenues allocation.46 
45 For discussion, see richard M. auty and raymond F. Mikesell, Sustainable 
Development in Mineral Economies, (oxford: Clarendon press, 1998); Ugo Fasano, 
“review of the experience with oil stabilization and savings funds in selected 
countries,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/112, (Washington D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 2002); humphreys et al., Escaping the Resource Curse, op cit.
46 While the Chad Cameroon project was hailed as a ‘new model’ for oil 
development in poor countries and benefited from unprecedented attention 
and efforts, the project failed to ensure that strong institutions were in place 
before oil revenues start flowing and the government faced bankruptcy in the 
face of armed opposition. See Ian Gary and nikki reisch, Chad’s Oil: Miracle or 
Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State, Catholic relief 
Services and Bank Information Center, 2005.
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PART 3: STRENGTHENING RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE
robust institutions can address some of the 
deleterious economic and political impacts 
of resource dependence and thereby help to 
consolidate peace. Many of these institutions 
directly relate to domestic statebuilding. The 
state, however, does not operate in a vacuum. The 
international institutional environment and the 
behavior of multinational extractive companies 
are central to post-conflict recovery. Two 
proposals for strengthening resource governance 
are presented below, both of which require the 
support of international as well as domestic actors: 
a national extractive-sector compact on resource 
governance; and an international agreement on 
extractive sectors, including an international 
revenue management agency.
PROPOSAL 6: SET UP A RESOURCE COMPACT 
VIA AN EXTRACTIVE SECTOR FORUM THAT 
INCLUDES ALL STAKEHOLDERS, AND ESTABLISH 
AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY.
Incentives are a major driver of policy outcomes. 
Because resource sectors and post-conflict contexts 
are highly specific, finding the right balance of 
incentives is less a matter of applying a blueprint 
than of overcoming particularistic interests 
opposed to the public interest. The public itself 
needs to come forth, informed and supported by 
civil society organizations, reformist politicians and 
bureaucrats, aid donors, and progressive extractive 
companies. one striking feature of post-conflict 
resource reforms is the frequently confrontational 
engagement of civil society organizations with 
companies and authorities, and the criminalization 
of extractive activities of local populations.47  In 
the best cases, this leads to changes in the right 
direction, but on many occasions the outcome 
is greater secrecy and repression. another 
47 Cumbersome regulatory measures and ‘crackdowns’ on so-called illegal 
logging or mining are common place in post-conflict countries, and can represent 
a barrier to local livelihoods recovºery and bias favoring revenue concentration 
by large corporations. See neil Cooper, “picking out the pieces of the liberal 
peaces: representations of Conflict economies and the Implications for policy,” 
Security Dialogue 36(4), 2005: 463-478; heiko nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard, 
“The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and 
peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping 12(2), 2005: 222-239.
common feature is an outdated, ineffective, or 
corrupt regulatory environment. The resource 
compact should thus allow for both constructive 
engagement among stakeholders and improved 
regulatory capacities in terms of legislation, 
implementation, and monitoring.
The heart of the compact is an extractive sector 
forum that should bring together citizens, 
politicians, and companies into public debates 
that are reported by the media and considered 
by relevant institutions such as parliamentary 
commissions, relevant ministries, donor agencies, 
and extractive companies.48  a main priority of 
the forum is to identify and spell out the nature, 
objectives, and operational principles guiding 
the extractive sector.49  The forum should play an 
active role in informing the general population 
about the resource sectors, including the 
potential value of reserves, forecasted revenue 
streams, the possible modes of exploitation and 
their socio-environmental impacts, in order to 
foster accountability mechanisms. To this end, 
the forum should have a secretariat capable of 
acquiring, analyzing, and diffusing information. 
a second priority of the forum is to provide a 
public platform for extractive sector stakeholders, 
notably for marginalized ones. Such platform 
can facilitate representation and negotiations in 
shaping sectoral policy and legislative affairs, and 
contribute to filling the regulatory vacuum of post-
conflict transition.
48 See, for example, Business principles for Sudan during the Interim period 
(www.ecosonline.org). In this case, the forum was a consortium of european 
civil society organizations that spelled out the principles, activities, normative 
framework, and benchmarks for oil companies to play a positive role in Sudan.
49 For an example of the limits and possible biases of participatory politics 
and stakeholder consultation processes over oil revenue allocation, see M. 
humphreys, W.M. Masters, and M.e. Sandbu, “The role of leaders in democratic 
deliberations. results from a field experiment in São Tomé and príncipe,” World 
Politics, 58(4), 2006: 583-622.
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The resource compact should establish an 
independent extractive sector monitoring body. 
arm’s length relations are key to credible monitoring, 
and should be strengthened through financing 
by a donor trust fund and diversity in monitoring 
team membership. The monitoring body should 
enjoy freedom of access to information and field 
sites (including to company sites), and its findings 
in turn should be reported to the public. Support 
should also be provided for the complementary 
state monitoring agency so that the state’s capacity 
to perform its regulatory role is consolidated.
PROPOSAL 7: NEGOTIATE AN INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR AGREEMENT AND 
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT AGENCY.
Conflict situations have focused the attention 
of the international community on resource 
governance, opening political space for an 
international agreement on extractive industries.50 
an international task force including national 
governments, relevant international organizations, 
industry associations and civil society organizations 
is needed to negotiate such an agreement, drawing 
on relevant existing international law and codes of 
conduct.51  national ratification of the agreement 
could be backed by incentives, as well as by peer 
and consumer pressure. This agreement would 
have the potential to achieve the status of a 
widespread mandatory norm.
among its key elements, the agreement should 
define “conflict resources” and set clear ethical 
norms and reporting procedures regarding 
revenues generated in conflict-affected countries 
in order to deter activities that risk prolonging or 
reigniting violent conflicts. one useful definition is 
proposed by Global Witness: conflict resources are 
50 See, for example, the proposal for an international charter for extractive 
industries of paul Collier, The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are 
Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (oxford: oxford University press, 
2007). Collier’s proposal would establish voluntary norms, in contrast to an 
international agreement that would acquire a mandatory status in international 
law.
51 The joint task force could draw upon the experience of the Kimberley 
process, the World Bank extractive industries review, the Canadian Government 
roundtable on extractive industries, and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development project.
“natural resources whose systematic exploitation 
and trade in a context of conflict contribute 
to, benefit from, or result in the commission of 
serious violations of human rights, violations 
of international humanitarian law or violations 
amounting to crimes under international law”.52 
resources suspected of meeting such criteria 
should be subject to independent investigations, 
such as those of Un expert panels, and the activities 
and assets of companies involved in these sectors 
made liable to international sanctions, fines, and 
criminal procedures.
Second, the agreement should set contractual 
benchmarks, notably in terms of standards for 
public bidding procedures, tax assessment (in 
order to avoid transfer pricing and other tax 
avoidance mechanisms), and transparency 
and accountability in revenue collection and 
allocation. The agreement also needs to address 
resource revenue risk, notably by facilitating 
access to revenue smoothing instruments and 
by better sharing risk between companies and 
governments. 
Third, an International revenue Management 
agency should be created as part of the 
agreement. The mandate of this agency would be 
to ensure that the “revenue pipeline” between 
companies, governments, and populations is 
tight, and that revenues – whether in the form 
of direct disbursement, public services, or both – 
reach the population. In effect, the agency would 
provide international insurance mechanisms, 
in a manner analogous to the role that export 
credit and receivables management agencies now 
play in reducing investment and revenue risks 
for extractive companies. There is considerable 
expertise available for companies to recover lost 
revenues following currency or political crises, yet 
52 Global Witness, The Sinews of War: Eliminating the Trade in Conflict 
Resources, 2007, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/definition_
of_conflict_resources.html. See also, le Billon, “Getting it done,” op cit.
The people of low-income 
producing countries should not 
bear more risks than large and 
highly profitable companies.
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little of that expertise has been deployed on behalf 
of the interests of local populations in producing 
countries. The people of low-income producing 
countries should not bear more risks than large 
and highly profitable companies.
The agency could protect populations from 
revenue volatility linked to unforeseen events, 
currency devaluation, and resource price 
variations, using revenue stabilization instruments 
and direct budgetary assistance, to support and 
complement the role of existing institutions (e.g., 
producers associations and international financial 
institutions). The agency could also respond to tax 
evasion and corruption, addressing complaints 
by citizens and civil society with regard to fiscal 
management. It could conduct budgetary audits to 
assess the “spending” side of revenue management 
and track down irregularities, which could then 
be publicly reported and addressed through local 
or international institutions. In exceptional cases, 
government revenues could be directed towards 
a trust held by the agency. Financing for the 
agency could be secured through a consortium of 
donors, companies, and producing governments. 
Incentives for all parties would include greater 
stability and greater legitimacy for the resource 
sector activities.
CONCLUSIONS
post-conflict environments present a promising 
but challenging context for managing extractive 
sector revenues. a central question is whether 
revenues should be shared among governments 
in a divided state and among parties in a coalition 
government. The record of wealth sharing 
agreements in the past two decades has been 
poor. Wealth sharing may enable the positive 
conclusion of a peace negotiation, but it does not 
guarantee conflict settlement over the medium 
term. efforts to mainstream the management of 
extractive sectors into conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding initiatives should not only focus 
on drafting agreements sensitive to extractive 
sector issues, but also on providing the guarantees 
that extend from rights over natural resources to 
accountability mechanisms in revenue allocation. 
Without such guarantees, wealth sharing is 
insufficient, and in the wrong political context it 
can even prove counterproductive. In addition, 
the rights of transitional governments to allocate 
long-term resource exploitation contracts should 
be curtailed, and the resource revenues generated 
under transitional governments should be under 
external supervision.
a second question is whether extractive sectors 
should be rapidly developed, even if at the 
expense of domestic entrepreneurship and/or 
fiscal revenues. extractive industries can spur 
economic recovery and contribute to political 
stability, but a first requirement for these positive 
impacts is for relevant institutions to be sufficiently 
strong before exploitation occurs. rather than 
rushing to involve foreign companies, domestic 
entrepreneurship should also be developed to 
the fullest. Comprehensive options assessments 
should be systematically conducted, and resource 
exploitation should be the subject of prior and free 
informed consent by local communities. To these 
ends, an international agreement on extractive 
sectors and the reappraisal of previous extractive 
resource contracts are proposed.
a final issue is that of revenue allocation 
mechanisms, including responses to the instability 
and exhaustibility of resource revenues. revenue 
stabilization funds should be promoted with the 
support of donors and extractive companies. 
Savings funds, in contrast, are not a priority in poor 
countries, and if introduced they should be limited 
to a small amount of revenue whose management 
can help build institutional capacity for long-term 
financial planning. Direct payments or resource 
revenues to the population should also be given 
serious consideration, particularly where poverty 
rates are high and resource revenues are sufficient 
to make a difference for the poor. an international 
agreement, including an international revenue 
management agency, should seek to reduce the 
economic and political risks faced by populations 
in producing countries.
Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments
/ 15 /
The objectives and behavior of international 
agencies play an important role in reforming 
extractive resource sectors. Intergovernmental 
organizations and donor agencies should provide 
assistance to maximize revenue collection and to 
ensure transparent, fair, and accountable allocation. 
revenue and socio-economic forecasting should 
be provided and the results widely broadcasted 
so as to build realistic expectations in the 
government and among the population. Donors 
should not systematically promote FDI-related 
extractive policies and projects – at present a 
central goal of their export and credit agencies – 
over domestic entrepreneurship. rather, donors 
should support host authorities in allocating 
resource reserves according to broader social and 
environmental criteria, including the protection 
and strengthening of local livelihoods. Given that 
greater resource revenues eventually reduce donor 
financial leverage, as the relative importance of 
aid diminishes, extractive companies should enter 
into agreement with donor agencies to ensure 
the durability of reforms. an incentive to do so 
could be provided by making such agreement a 
condition of access to the services of export credit 
agencies. an international extractive industries 
agreement would help to curtail competitive 
behavior among donors eager to promote their 
resource interests, and provide a legal environment 
guiding the behavior of extractive companies and 
governments.
The options and proposals advanced in this paper 
are not equally applicable to all cases of post-
conflict extractive resource management. The 
specifics of the setting – the sectors involved, the 
capacity of institutions, and broader political and 
economic aspects of post-conflict recovery – will 
play a major part in deciding which to pursue. 
Just as importantly, the pursuit of these options 
will require champions and the appropriate set of 
incentives.

